Simulating the Reported Archive.today Request Flood — Analysis & Defense

When an Archive Becomes a Traffic Weapon — new simulation & analysis

Long-form breakdown of the reported archive.today behavior, step-by-step explanation of the code's effect, simulation, videos, and sources. Allegations are presented as reported by linked sources. :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}

Auto narration: ON

Interactive simulation

Simulation of Repeated Request Attack — Visual (safe)

This interactive simulation shows how a short client-side timer + randomized query pattern builds steady request traffic. Important: the demo does not perform any network requests — every URL is simulated and local to your browser.

Interval 300 ms

Total requests
0

Requests/sec
0.00

Mode
Sim-only

[Simulated request log — no network requests are made]

Step-by-step (readable)

Reported evidence includes a code snippet that used setInterval(..., 300) and randomized query strings to avoid caching; this pattern was the basis for the original complaints. :contentReference[oaicite:6]{index=6}

Tip: use Reset before adjusting the slider for a clean demo. This visualization is suitable for screen recording; it will show the effect a repeated client-side loop creates on a target URL.

Technical breakdown — why repeated randomized requests increase load

The observed pattern reported in the original investigation calls a target endpoint with randomized query parameters on each timer tick. Because each request appears unique, intermediate caches (CDNs and reverse proxies) cannot serve cached responses for subsequent requests — the origin must process each one. The cumulative effect across many clients is a high, continuous request rate that can exhaust CPU, I/O and database resources.

Mechanics (short)

1. Timer: a function scheduled every N ms (reported ~300ms).
2. Randomization: the query string includes a random token to prevent cache hits.
3. Request: the page issues a network request (reported as `fetch()` in the original post).
4. Repeat: continues while the page remains open — each browser becomes a small traffic generator.

When many visitors have that page open, the aggregate request rate multiplies rapidly. This is the effect the community described as DDoS-like. See the primary report for the investigator's full code sample and screenshots. :contentReference[oaicite:7]{index=7}

Community walkthroughs & videos

Analysts and community members recorded demonstrations and logs that accompany the investigation.

Timeline & community reaction

The Gyrovague write-up laid out the timeline and included screenshots and correspondence; the post generated active discussion on Hacker News and Reddit as users analyzed code, reproduced logs, and debated intent. :contentReference[oaicite:8]{index=8}

Notable community points:

• Users on Hacker News examined the snippet and asked for reproducible tests; various participants validated the observed network pattern. :contentReference[oaicite:9]{index=9}
• Reddit /r/DataHoarder participants discussed mitigation and shared their own observations and logs. :contentReference[oaicite:10]{index=10}
• Archival community aggregators (Lobsters) collected context and background on the history and related threads. :contentReference[oaicite:11]{index=11}

Sources & primary materials

Read the primary reporting and community threads yourself:

• Gyrovague — original investigator post (code, screenshots, timeline). :contentReference[oaicite:12]{index=12}
• Hacker News discussion thread. :contentReference[oaicite:13]{index=13}
• Reddit /r/DataHoarder thread. :contentReference[oaicite:14]{index=14}
• Lobsters aggregation & context. :contentReference[oaicite:15]{index=15}
• Additional posted correspondence and pastes as referenced in the Gyrovague post.

Statements about operator intent, nationality, or alleged coercive behavior are included here as reported by those sources. This post does not assert criminal liability or government involvement; consult primary links and decide for yourself. :contentReference[oaicite:16]{index=16}